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Research data for this article 
Due to the sensitive nature of the questions asked in this study, interviewees were assured that 








 Purchaser engagement strengthens purchasing but can involve high transaction costs 
 A purchaser’s strategic lens should focus on chain-wide improvement but also on 
accessibility 
 A directive-influencing style enables chain-wide improvement but may create over-
interference 










Healthcare purchasing organisations in both insurance-based and tax-based healthcare 
systems struggle to improve chronic care. A key challenge for purchasers is to deal with the 
chain of multiple providers involved in caring for patients with complex needs. To date, most 
research has focused on differences between healthcare systems in terms of regulation, tools 
and the freedom that healthcare purchasers have. However, this does not explain how such 











A better understanding of this link between system characteristics and purchaser behaviour 
would assist policymakers seeking to improve healthcare purchasing. This multiple case study 
conducted in England, Sweden and the Netherlands examines the link between the different 
healthcare systems’ characteristics and the purchasers’ strategies and actions when managing 
chronic care chains. Purchasers’ strategies and actions varied in terms of the purchaser’s 
engagement, strategic lens and influencing style. Our findings suggest that differences in 
purchaser competition, purchaser governance and patient choice in healthcare systems are key 
factors in explaining a purchaser’s strategies and actions when pursuing improvements in 
chronic care. This study contributes to knowledge on what shapes the purchaser’s role, and 










Third-party purchasing and commissioning organisations such as health insurers and 
governmental bodies (hereafter, ‘purchasers’) are expected to foster improvements in care 
provision through their role as contractors of care [1]. However, purchasers in both insurance- 
and tax-based healthcare systems struggle to drive providers towards improved care delivery 
[2-4]. Although studies show significant variation between countries in how purchasers fulfil 
their role, how healthcare system characteristics shape individual purchaser’s strategies and 
actions remains largely unknown. We contribute to this topic through three in-depth case 
studies of how healthcare purchasers in different countries improve care delivery, and how the 
different system characteristics affect their strategies and actions. 
With an increasing number of patients with chronic and/or complex illnesses, 
policymakers require purchasers to manage entire ‘care chains’ in an attempt to control rising 
healthcare costs, increase access to care and improve care outcomes [5]. To do so, purchasers 
need to manage care chains as a coordinated, integrated system, and therefore stimulate 
collaboration between providers [6,7]. Further, patients should experience the service they 
receive along the chain of referrals from one provider to another as an integrated whole. 
Current contract negotiations rarely reflect the need for a chain perspective, and are typically 
between a purchaser and a single provider rather than between a purchaser and the network of 
providers that make up a care chain. Chain-wide improvements require complex medical and 
financial negotiations with these providers. In these negotiations, power, dependence, 
relationality and trust play a role [4,8-11]. What strategies and actions purchasers employ, and 
how effectively, is likely to be affected by the characteristics of the healthcare system itself. 
Studying how these characteristics shape purchasers’ strategies and actions will help explain 
how purchasers can develop and deploy their strategic role, and how policymakers can create 











This paper therefore addresses the question: How do characteristics of the healthcare 
system influence a purchaser’s strategies and actions when pursuing chain-wide 
improvements? We focus on healthcare system characteristics related to national or regional 
policies that directly influence the purchasers’ strategies and actions. Regarding strategies, we 
explore the purchasers’ goals and plans, and their subsequent intended and emergent actions 
[12,13]. Using multiple case studies, we explore what drives or enables purchasers to pursue 
chain-wide improvements in chronic care delivery in regions of England, Sweden and the 
Netherlands. Each region is a ‘vanguard’ in the sense that policymakers have given 
purchasers increased opportunities in an attempt to stimulate new approaches in care delivery. 
It will be in these areas, if anywhere, that purchasers’ use of their freedom to take initiatives 
will become apparent, providing ‘best case’ insights into how care coordination policy 













Improving chronic care delivery 
How care chains are organised has a strong influence on the quality and costs of the services 
provided [14]. Although the organisation of care chains is usually stipulated through national 
care guidelines and protocols, in practice the actual delivery of care varies considerably [15]. 
In terms of task division, a multi-provider care pathway [16] should inform providers as to 
how chronic patients will enter the pathway, what treatment and diagnostics they will receive 
from which provider, when they will be referred to another provider and when they will be 
referred back. As such, one requires inter-provider agreements covering expertise, tasks, 
responsibilities, scheduling and referrals [5-7,17]. On the operational level, structures are 
required within and between providers to enable the exchange of diagnostic, treatment and 
referral information (which requires suitable information technologies), regular inter-
professional consultations and shared treatment plans for individual patients [5-7]. A 
prerequisite is that the various care professionals know each other and can reach each other to 
collaborate in improving patient treatment [5-7]. 
Purchasers are key stakeholders in care chains as they can improve the task division and 
collaboration between providers by making agreements on quality and costs [1,2,18,19]. 
Surprisingly, the way in which healthcare purchasers fulfil this role and how the healthcare 
system shapes their strategies and actions has not been comprehensively researched. 
 
Healthcare systems and purchasing 
In many countries, health ministries have stimulated purchasers to experiment with incentive 
schemes to improve care coordination. Several European health systems have designated 
vanguard regions where purchasers are given more freedom than elsewhere to experiment 
[20-22]. These purchasers can adopt novel incentive schemes such as pay-for-performance, 
bundled payments, shared savings, prime provider and long-term, population-based contracts 
[23-25]. It is especially here that ‘purchasers need the tools for strategic purchasing’ [18] and, 
as such, vanguard regions are valuable in understanding how policy and regulation drive 
purchasing strategies and actions. 
Where the literature does consider this topic, it mainly compares purchasing systems in terms 
of the rules concerning which services are obligatory in insurance packages, whether service 
tariffs are freely negotiable or predetermined, and which authorities regulate purchasers 
[1,2,18,19]. There has been less focus on the care coordination strategies and actions that 
purchasers develop in practice in response to the healthcare system’s characteristics. 
Purchasers’ strategies and actions can differ in terms of coercive versus collaborative 
approaches [4,9,11]. Also, in both insurance- and tax-based healthcare systems, purchasers 
use a combination of methods to steer providers: through regulation, monitoring, financial 
incentives, persuasion, support or collaboration [2,4,9,11]. How different health policies lead 
to different purchaser behaviour in terms of their strategies and actions remains a largely 
unanswered question. 
More specifically, there is an incomplete understanding of how purchasers respond to and/or 
make use of the different environmental circumstances and opportunities created by the 











chains for treating patients with chronic health problems. This is the starting point for our 
multiple case study in which we inductively determine which key healthcare system 
characteristics shape purchasers’ strategies and actions, and how. 
Methods 
We chose a multiple case study approach which fits with the descriptive and explanatory 
nature of our research question [26,27]. The aim of our analysis was 1) to describe differences 
in healthcare system characteristics and purchaser strategies and actions between the studied 
cases and 2) to search for explanatory patterns of how these characteristics translate into 
purchasing approaches. With the latter goal we have focused on a health policy contribution, 
providing understanding of how purchaser strategies and actions develop. 
 
The unit of analysis is the purchaser in a regional health economy, i.e. an area corresponding 
to a single health region. By focusing on the care of patients with Chronic Obstructive 
Pulmonary Disease (COPD), we were able to systematically compare different purchasing 
regimes while holding the type of care group constant. COPD is a good example of a chronic 
disease where improved task division and collaboration could achieve better care outcomes 
[28-30]. This study focuses specifically on the extent of the alignment between primary 
(particularly GP) and specialised hospital care, since this plays an important role in the 
delivery of COPD care. We focus less on the role of home and social healthcare since these, 
in the countries studied, are mostly purchased by separate, usually municipal, organisations. 
The context of COPD care is thus used to understand how purchaser strategies and actions 
develop in demarcated case studies. Hence we do not aim to provide a health service of health 
outcome endpoint. 
 
Research setting and case selection 
We investigated the coordination of chronic care chains by regional purchasing organisations 
in three countries with different healthcare system characteristics. In each case, the healthcare 
purchaser faces a similar problem: increasing numbers of patients with chronic diseases in 
general and COPD in particular, leading to extensive use of hospital care services and 
associated costs. To ease this problem, purchasers are attempting to improve collaboration 
between primary and secondary care providers, and between different primary care providers 
(such as between the general practitioner (GP) and nursing or therapy services); and to shift 
tasks such as regular check-ups or lifestyle advice from the hospital to primary care providers 
(e.g. GPs, community nurses). Especially for patients with a chronic disease such as COPD, 
this may lead to earlier detection of symptoms and improve patients’ capacities to deal with 
their disease, both of which contribute positively to patient health and reduce clinically 
unnecessary emergency hospitalisation [28-31]. 
 
Adopting a theoretical replication logic to answer our research question, we selected regions 
that were expected to provide sufficient variation in the type of purchasing system used [27]. 
We selected cases that differed in purchaser market type: private insurance (competitive) 
versus a public (monopolistic) purchasing system. Next, we assessed the properties of each 











purchaser operated in a different system and region, in all countries purchasers are expected to 
fulfil the task to strategically contract chain-wide care [32-37]. Supplement A provides an 
overview of each case in terms of the differences in purchasing and payment systems, the care 
providers directly or indirectly involved in COPD care delivery and which other organisations 
are involved in paying for, organising and planning care (such as municipalities). Through 
this, we show, for each country, the boundaries within which the purchaser can operate when 
seeking to improve the coordination of COPD care. Subsequently, we considered how the 
purchaser acts within these boundaries. Also, we assessed how and to what extent purchasers 
tried to steer using tools within the limits of healthcare regulation. Each studied region can be 
considered a vanguard area where the purchaser has been granted additional freedom to 
pursue novel approaches to improve chronic care delivery. That is, we took a ‘positive 
deviance’ sample, selecting sites where, in that health system, a purchaser’s strategies and 
actions could be expected to have the greatest impact on improving the coordination of 
chronic care chains [38]. Whether and how a purchaser uses this freedom will provide an 




We interviewed people involved in contracting and commissioning chronic care services 
within purchaser and provider organisations (i.e. those who are part of the communication 
channel between purchaser and provider). On the purchasing side, we interviewed contract 
managers, medical advisors and higher-level managers. With care providers, we interviewed 
managers, medical specialists, GPs, nurses and physiotherapists (Table 1). The interview 
protocol was structured in four parts with the aim of gathering information on: how chronic 
care in general and COPD care specifically are currently organised, coordinated and 
delivered; how the purchaser attempts to improve the chronic care chain; what health 
regulations and policies are in place; and how these enable or constrain the purchaser. In total, 
we conducted 22 single and group interviews (between 37 and 88 minutes long), involving a 
total of 26 people. All interviewees gave written consent to participating in this research. 
 
We supplemented our interview data with, and triangulated it against, 878 pages of secondary 
data from published management reports, care protocols, presentations and reports on 
regional demographics which helped to explain purchaser’s strategies and actions. We used 
health system reports and papers to further establish and distinguish the different healthcare 
system characteristics (see Table 1 and Supplement A). 
 
----------------- Insert Table 1 here -------------------- 
 
Data analysis 
As the first step of analysis, we carried out inductive coding, adhering as far as possible to the 
terms and language used by our interviewees. In this way, we developed a comprehensive list 
of first-order codes related to healthcare system characteristics and purchasing strategies and 
actions. We searched for healthcare system characteristics related to national or regional 










methodology [39], we inductively translated the first-order codes into aggregated second-
order codes, doing so in light of known healthcare system characteristics, and purchasers’ 
strategies and actions, gleaned from healthcare policy and purchasing literature. This resulted 
in the categorisation presented later in the results section, containing those healthcare system 
characteristics that directly influence the different purchasing strategies and actions. In terms 
of purchaser strategies and actions, we also searched for goals, plans and intended or 
emergent actions as defined by Mintzberg [12,13]. We developed case descriptions for each 
of the studied regions to enhance understanding of how purchasers manage their care chain. 
Through this coding process and case analysis, and discussions among the authors, we linked 
the different healthcare system characteristics with the purchasers’ strategies and actions. 
 
In each within-case analysis, we discuss how the focal healthcare purchaser coordinates its 
care chain and what this implies for improving care delivery. We briefly describe the context 
within which each purchaser does so, giving more detail in Supplement A. The inductive 
coding process subdivided the purchasers’ strategies and actions into seven categories: 
clinical involvement, support to providers, relationship management, focus of attention, time 
horizon, power use and chain management approach. Next, we established which 
characteristics of a healthcare system affect the purchaser’s strategies and actions. We found 
these to be single- vs multi-purchaser system, purchaser’s internal governance and the extent 
of patients’ choice for secondary care. Following each case description, we summarise the 
findings supported by quotes from the interviews (Tables 2-4). We then report a cross-case 
analysis where we infer patterns to provide an understanding of how each key healthcare 






The healthcare system 
Most primary and secondary care services in England are purchased by local area Clinical 
Commissioning Groups (CCGs) which represent GPs. The CCG we studied covers a 
suburban population of about 300,000 (see Table 1) in the Midlands. For COPD care, the 
main care providers in the studied region are an NHS Foundation Trust that incorporates 3 
hospitals and 12 clinics, and 46 GP practices. The Foundation Trust also has several 
community nurses providing COPD care. As such, most COPD care is contracted by the CCG 
itself. In addition, the municipality council commissions home and social care. There is a 
natural link between the CCG and the municipality (they both serve the same population), but 
fragmentation between the services they commission remains a problem. 
 
Purchaser strategies and actions 
The steering by the CCG has a strongly medical character with GPs, commissioning managers 
and other CCG employees frequently discussing with care providers how tasks should be 











is reflected in, for example, them initiating projects that lead to better management of 
chronically ill patients. By setting up multidisciplinary teams involving both primary and 
secondary care providers, professionals are brought together to discuss individual patients. 
The purchaser is furthermore aware of provider concerns, such as those of GPs who often lack 
the capacity to take over hospital tasks. As such, the CCG has a relational and trust-based way 
of commissioning. This approach seems to be driven by the fact that the CCG is led by GPs, 
and by their dependence on good relationships with other providers. 
In the current system, primary and secondary care are based on very different 
contracts. General practice contracts are capitation-based with incentives for outcome 
improvements. Secondary care contracts are activity-based using standard, nationally defined 
Diagnosis Related Group (DRG)-based prices. The CCG is trying to move from this 
fragmented, provider-focused approach towards a more chain-wide and long-term approach, 
which is also supported by regulators such as NHS England. The CCG’s expressed goal is to 
develop a fifteen-year population-based contract, in which primary and secondary care 
providers participate jointly, that rewards improvements through pay-for-performance 
schemes. In this way, the purchaser is seeking to align the currently conflicting financial 
interests of the providers and to financially support a budgetary shift from secondary to 
primary care. In addition, the CCG also collaborates closely with other local authorities 
responsible for contracting services for COPD patients. 
Although the CCG predominantly expresses its attitude as collaborative, trust-based 
and professional, we also observed conflicting behaviour, in particular coercion. For example, 
some care providers are reluctant to sign population-based contracts as these create financial 
uncertainty. The CCG uses its position as sole purchaser, with the option of competitively re-
procuring services, to enforce such a change. Providers expressed the CCG’s involvement as 
going too far, becoming meddlesome or creating an administrative burden. 
The CCG that we studied also takes the patients’ perspective into consideration and 
had recently conducted a public consultation to understand current problems and patients’ 
needs. Meetings, supported by medical professionals, are organised where patients can 
exchange experiences and information. 
Finally, patients are constrained in their choice of secondary care because England has 
a GP gatekeeper system. Moreover, patient demand for secondary care exceeds supply. In 
practice, and despite official policy, patients often have a limited choice of hospital if they do 
not want a lengthy wait, and patients often delegate the choice to their GP. This limited 
patient choice supports the CCG in its efforts to shift services from secondary to primary care. 
 
Consequences 
The combination of professional and coercive steering could be called a ‘paternalistic’ 
approach to achieving chain-wide improvement. Since the CCG has both professional and 
financial influence, it is able to initiate several changes in community-based chronic care 
management. The CCG has established several small- to medium-scale projects aimed at 
health improvements for COPD patients (and others). Notably, the purchaser aims to support 
these changes by aligning the financial incentives for all the relevant providers through a 
long-term, population-based contract. Regional evaluation reports indicate that the CCG’s 











challenges in the region. Although the clinical orientation seems a promising one, the ongoing 
pressure on NHS budgets forces the CCG to balance care quality and access. As elsewhere in 
England, issues concerning access remain problematic in the studied region. 
The implementation of the long-term population-based contract was seen as complex 
and slow, and was still ongoing at the time of our study. Despite the CCG’s strong position in 
the region, its approach still involved high transaction costs in the form of negotiation, 
compromise and considerable bureaucracy. Providers indicated that the CCG’s approach was 
sometimes seen as laborious and meddlesome. This suggests that excessive involvement can 
sometimes be counterproductive. 
 
----------------- Insert Table 2 here -------------------- 
Sweden 
 
The healthcare system 
In Sweden, almost all private and public care providers are funded by County Council (CC) 
budgets. CCs are regional bureaucracies led by closely involved regional politicians. The 
region studied has an urban population of more than 1 million (see Table 1) and was one of 
three large regions in Sweden where residents have a free choice to go to primary care, 
multiple hospitals and outpatient clinics within their region. 
Care for patients with COPD is provided by 14 hospitals in the region, including a 
university hospital and 4 private hospitals (3 of them non-profit). Patients are free to choose 
between hospitals within the region. Care outside the region is only financed if there are long 
waiting times. There are about 255 healthcare centres, either GP practices, outpatient clinics 
or hybrid forms, of which about 60% are publicly owned. Social and mental healthcare is 
partly organised by primary care centres and funded by CCs. Other social, home and public 
care is funded and/or provided by the municipal government. At the time of the study, fees 
were applied of around 200 Krone (€20) per GP visit and 350 Krone (€35) per specialist visit. 
GP referrals are not required for hospital or outpatient care. Thus, constraints on choosing 
specialized care providers are considered low. 
 
Purchaser strategies and actions 
As a public, politically led organisation, the CC has a clear responsibility for the whole 
population. Several medical advisors work part-time for the CC and part-time as practitioners. 
They generally address problems from a professional perspective and have strong networks 
with care providers. The CC supports several projects aimed at improving care for patients 
with chronic illnesses, paying particular attention to improving task division and collaboration 
among the multiple care providers involved. Extensive national and regional guidelines that 
address the interface between primary and secondary care have been developed in 
collaboration with professionals and published online to enhance choice. Further, the CC has 
supported the care delivery system by establishing a new IT system to facilitate information 
exchange between primary and secondary care providers. 
The CC pays close attention to the patient’s position within the care chain. This was 
reflected in CC employees addressing problems from a patient perspective and considering 










lifestyle). The CC actively guides patients in finding an appropriate provider or in improving 
how they deal with their disease themselves. This is achieved through helplines staffed by 
nurses and by websites which advise on treatment possibilities for specific diseases. Although 
patients have considerable freedom to choose any of the available primary and secondary care 
providers within their county, the CC encourages them to enrol at a GP practice. Interestingly, 
this focus on steering the patient seems not only driven by a professional perspective but also 
as a way of counteracting the CC’s limited influence caused by patients’ free provider choice. 
The CC has developed elaborate quality and outcome indicators and has considerable 
experience with linking these to performance-based payments and contracts, which are 
strongly linked to well-developed regional and national quality and outcome monitoring. 
Nevertheless, the CC had recognised that chain-wide performance measures were still lacking 
and that balancing a hospital’s mix of patients is challenging. Due to the limited effects of 
steering based on pay-for-performance, and the significant increase in hospital spending, the 
CC has gone back to a budget approach to funding hospitals. 
The purchaser’s political accountability and the need to steer patients along the care 
chain seemed to translate into a regulatory role enacted by setting standards, guidelines and 
financial incentives. Although this purchaser’s attitude can be seen as supportive and taking 
responsibility for patients and the population, it also has a downside. Care providers 
commented that the purchaser’s regulatory approach does not always align with care delivery 
in practice, and that this adds an administrative burden. 
 
Consequences 
The CC’s chain-wide strategy aims to improve chronic care delivery by giving attention to 
providers, patients, public health issues and the healthcare system infrastructure. However, in 
practice, the CC’s highly regulatory approach appeared to not always be effective, and 
professionals perceive it as over-regulated. The regulatory approach can at least in part be 
explained by the CC’s limited influence on care delivery given that patients have free 
provider choice. 
Within the CC, there are tensions between employees focused on medical issues and 
those focused on regulatory/cost aspects. Whilst there is a strong medical advisor 
involvement, there are also contracting managers focused on containing costs and regulatory 
responsibilities. The politically led purchaser appears somewhat inflexible and bound by a 
short-to-medium term time horizon which, in practice, hampers the implementation of 
promising improvement initiatives. 
 




The healthcare system 
In the Netherlands, health insurers are responsible for contracting GP and hospital care. Each 
insurer’s budget depends largely on their income from their policy holders and every citizen is 
obliged to have medical cover. For specialized care, patients have to pay up to a maximum of 











urban-rural province of about 500,000 inhabitants (see Table 1). The region has five hospitals, 
including a university medical centre, and about 200 independent GP practices. For chronic 
diseases such as COPD, diabetes and cardiovascular diseases, most GPs deliver so-called 
“ketenzorg” (chain-care), which is contracted through a regional cooperative. Evaluations and 
interviewees indicated that this chain-care was still predominantly GP care, supported by 
specialized nurses [40]. As such, hospital, physiotherapy, rehabilitation and other services for 
COPD patients are still contracted separately. Since 2015, home nursing, most personal care 
and long-term mental healthcare have been contracted by health insurers [41]. Municipalities 
contract home support care, day care and elements of youth (mental health) care services. 
Alignment between health insurers and municipalities is developing gradually and is 
supported and monitored by the Dutch Health Authority (NZA) [40]. 
 
Purchaser strategies and actions 
The insurer in our study predominantly pursues a rather short-term strategy mainly driven by 
their goal of keeping insurance premiums low. This limits the purchaser’s willingness to 
invest in longer-term improvements in chronic care delivery. In making contracts with 
providers, the insurer aims to control budgets, primarily by including budget ceilings. Despite 
the purchaser’s intentions to create change, most of their projects remain small-scale and are 
often initiated by providers. This approach seems to be driven by the insurer’s perception of 
having little influence on care delivery and costs. As insurers compete for subscribers, who 
can switch insurer annually, they can usually contract providers for only part of the regional 
population. Conversely, the fact that providers do not depend on a single purchaser 
strengthens their bargaining position during budget negotiations. In addition, the low number 
of employees with a medical background within the insurer seems to contribute to their 
dominant cost-control strategy. 
Nevertheless, health insurers in the Netherlands are increasingly being reminded of their 
directing role and responsibility for driving improvements in care delivery. Further, there is 
increasing policy pressure to contain costs by shifting some secondary care to primary care 
providers, particularly by the National Framework Agreements initiated by the Ministry of 
Health. These agreements limit the growth of the national healthcare expenditure and 
encourage a budgetary shift to primary care. By changing regulations, the ministry and NZA 
furthermore encourage purchasers to sign long-term, population- or outcome-based contracts. 
In response, the health insurer has signed several long-term covenants with the largest 
regional hospitals. These covenants provide hospitals with continuity but only very limited 
flexibility on annual care expenses. The purchaser appears reluctant to sign long-term, 
population-based contracts based on quality outcomes that could deliver savings to support 
long-term care chain improvements. 
Further, the purchaser aims to gain goodwill from providers and thereby increase their 
influence on how the care chain is organised. The studied health insurer especially expresses 
how it values its relationship with the largest primary care cooperative. The purchaser’s 
dependence on large care organisations explains their investment in relationships with and 
between care providers. Despite this, the providers consider the clinical and supportive staff 
turnover at the insurer as high, and as hampering the continuity of projects and building up of 











care chain is the role of GPs as care coordinators and gatekeepers to secondary care. These 
GP roles support the purchaser’s attempts to shift patients to primary care since patients must 
have a GP referral before going on to secondary care. 
Consequences 
The health insurer understands the importance of working closely with care providers and 
building good relationships in order to achieve long-term care improvements. In practice, 
however, the insurer generally behaves as a typical business (albeit not-for-profit) 
organisation, with only a limited medical focus, because it is highly accountable to its 
subscribers and has responsibility for cost control. Tensions and conflicts between the insurer 
and providers are therefore common. As such, it is proving difficult to align the interests of 








Above, we showed how healthcare purchasers in each country operate differently within their 
respective healthcare systems. Figure 1 summarizes to what extent each key characteristic was 
present in each of the three studied cases. Despite facing very similar challenges in each of the 
vanguard regions, each purchaser’s strategies and actions varied significantly when pursuing 
chain-wide care delivery improvements. As presented, we see variations in the purchasers’ 
clinical involvement, support to providers, relationship management, focus of attention, time 
horizon, use of power and chain management approach (see tables 2-4). In the cross-case 
analysis below, we show how each of the seven categories of purchaser strategies and actions 
can be combined into three aggregate categories: purchaser engagement, purchaser’s strategic 
lens and purchaser’s influencing style. 
 
----------------- Insert Figure 1 here -------------------- 
 
Purchaser engagement 
A purchaser’s engagement is expressed by the extent of clinical involvement, support to 
providers and relationship management. We found relatively high, moderate and low clinical 
involvement in the regions in England, Sweden and the Netherlands respectively. The Dutch 
health insurer provides limited clinical substantiation of their contract proposals. Conversely, 
the GPs who have significant responsibility in the English CCG organization, express clear 
goals for improving population health. The Swedish CC, with a mix of clinical and non-
clinical staff, appears to be between the English and the Dutch regions. With respect to 
system support, in the English and Swedish cases, the purchaser staff seem able to understand 
the challenges that providers face in terms of IT systems, quality monitoring and dividing 
tasks between primary and secondary care. Likewise, the purchaser staff in these cases build 
long-term relationships with providers. In the Dutch situation, we found a predominantly 












The purchaser’s strategic lens 
Whether purchasers focus on patients or costs, and take a long-term or short-term perspective, 
can be classified as the purchaser’s strategic lens. The CCG in England gave the most 
attention to preventive care and improved task allocation from the patients’ perspective, 
supported by creating long-term financial perspectives for providers. Conversely, the health 
insurer in the Netherlands is pressured to focus more on short-term cost control as well as 
access to care. Again, the CC in the studied Swedish region falls somewhere between the 
English and Dutch cases. Here, the single purchaser system and significant clinical 
involvement drives a long-term strategic lens and places the patient at the centre of their 
purchasing strategy, while political governance also drives short-term cost controls. 
 
The purchaser’s influencing style 
How purchasers influence task division and collaboration along the care chain is expressed by 
their use of power and their chain management approach. The CCG in England is able to 
establish improvement projects and make new financial agreements with providers due to 
their relatively strong influence as a single purchaser. In the Netherlands, the purchaser 
mostly follows providers’ initiatives, amounting to a degree of provider-influenced 
purchasing, and only limitedly takes initiatives itself. Furthermore, the Swedish case study, 
where patients have a wide choice of providers, highlighted the CC’s limited ability to reduce 
the high percentage of patients being treated in hospitals or outpatient clinics. This not only 
provides limited steering power, but also leads to a somewhat regulatory and fragmented 
contracting approach towards care providers: ‘the money follows the patient’. Supported by a 
GP gatekeeper system, the purchasers in England and the Netherlands are able to pursue 
treatment of COPD patients in primary care settings and an integrated care chain. 
 
Table 5 summarizes the above cross-case comparison, combining the purchaser strategies and 
actions into aggregated categories. Further, we show that each of these aggregated categories 
are linked to certain healthcare system characteristics. This enables a deeper understanding of 
how healthcare system characteristics shape purchasers’ strategies and actions, which we will 
discuss further in the next section. 
 
----------------- Insert Table 5 here -------------------- 
Discussion 
This study aimed to answer the question ‘How do healthcare system characteristics influence 
a purchaser’s strategies and actions when pursuing chain-wide improvements?’ As 
presented, each of the focal healthcare purchasing organisations demonstrated a variety of 
strategies and actions in terms of their goals, plans and intended or emergent actions. Our 
findings link these different strategies and actions to the three observed key healthcare system 
characteristics (number of purchasers in a region, purchaser’s internal governance and extent 
of patient choice in seeking secondary care), thereby providing a better understanding of what 











patterns identified and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the different approaches 
that each purchaser has developed. 
Purchaser engagement 
Looking especially at the English CCG, we observe a highly engaged purchaser, interacting 
with providers and attending to both clinical and organizational problems. This seems a 
promising approach, with many initiatives involving a broad range of providers. Indeed, 
previous research suggests that collaboration between purchasers and providers creates value 
[4,9,42]. Comparing our three case studies suggests that a strong physician presence in the 
governance structure increases the clinical orientation in purchasing. When managerial 
interests dominate, more attention is given to costs and regulatory compliance. Although 
management and regulatory control is still present in the approaches used in England, this is 
to a lesser extent than in Sweden and the Netherlands and is more influenced by medical 
knowledge. Notably, the purchasing managers interviewed in the Netherlands saw the limited 
number of people with a medical background in their organisation as a shortcoming. 
Nevertheless, particularly in Sweden and England, it was also mentioned that excessive 
engagement by the purchaser can lead to an overload of initiatives, information and 
guidelines, thereby demanding considerable time and effort from both purchaser and provider 
employees. 
In terms of purchaser-provider relationships, having knowledge and an understanding 
of how providers deliver care seems to contribute to developing trust. Conversely, a more 
managerial governance structure seems to limit trust and reciprocity. This confirms earlier 
studies from the Netherlands that reported frequent tension and conflict between insurers and 
providers [4,43]. Dutch insurers seem reluctant to use innovative contracts with bonuses 
based purely on future performance improvements as a means of steering providers. This is 
because they foresee a risk of gaming, and see such contracts as rewarding providers for 
earlier poor results. Conversely, the English CCG perceived such contracts as an opportunity 
to reward good behaviour. 
 
Based on these findings, we advance the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1 
A highly engaged purchaser, driven by a system with clinically informed governance, benefits 
care chain management but this may come with higher transaction costs 
 
The purchaser’s strategic lens 
In both England and Sweden, a single purchaser takes responsibility for the entire population, 
fulfilling a public health role, attending to population-level needs, guiding patients towards 
appropriate providers and taking a long-term view. The ambition of the CCG to implement a 
long-term population contract reflects this approach. Not only being the single purchaser, but 
also having the ability to clinically substantiate changing models of delivering chronic care 
contributes to this purchasing approach. Although multi-year covenants are also becoming 
more common in the Netherlands, these agreements do not go as far as the long-term 











annual control of service volumes and costs. In Sweden, the purchaser has reverted from 
outcome-based funding to budget caps as political pressure to contain costs has increased. 
As Stolper et al. [44], we found that a health insurer who, for competitive reasons, 
needs to keep fees low is concerned that investing in care improvement and care-chain 
coordination will increase short-term costs without an immediate return on investment. In 
these circumstances, a purchaser who innovates in care coordination fears the financial risks 
of doing so. An earlier evaluation of vanguard sites in the Netherlands confirms this view: 
promising regional initiatives have not been translated into long-term agreements [21]. 
Purchaser competition however does highlight that care with long waiting times or capacity 
issues at providers can become a subject of public debate, damaging the insurer’s reputation 
and encouraging patients to switch insurer. 
 
These findings suggest:  
 
Proposition 2 
A long-term patient focus, driven by a system with a single purchaser and clinically informed 
governance, benefits care chain management, but this may come at the cost of short-term 
access to care 
 
The purchaser’s influencing style 
In England, the CCG could initiate a long-term, population-based contract and coerce the 
relocation of tasks from secondary to primary care because it was the dominant, virtually the 
only, funder in the local health economy. The Dutch health insurer had less influence because 
care providers do not depend on a single payer and could, if they objected strongly to 
proposed care-coordination strategies, refuse to sign a contract and seek public support. This 
occasionally happens in the Netherlands, and insurers fear it will reduce their number of 
clients. As earlier research [4] also found, this leads to impasses during the annual contract 
negotiations between purchasers and providers. In the English region, however, 
commissioners report that the clinical debates can go too far, thereby threatening the 
autonomy of specialist medical clinicians or causing a clash of visions. 
The Swedish purchaser puts much effort into managing the care chain as a whole and 
directing patients to the right provider. However, this approach is not very effective given that 
a patient’s wide choice of providers limits purchasers’ ability to coordinate care. Financial 
incentives currently reward specialised secondary care providers for maintaining high 
volumes of activity [45]. This is evidently problematic in Sweden, where there has been an 
increase in secondary care use, at the cost of primary care capacity. In England and the 
Netherlands, the desire to shift towards primary care is also present. The GP gatekeeper 
system in both countries and contributory payments for secondary care in the Netherlands 
limit patient freedom and this makes it easier for purchasers to steer patients towards primary 
care. 
In principle, patient freedom to choose from a wide range of providers could stimulate 
providers to improve the quality of care and patient satisfaction as a way to attract more 
patients. However, in practice, patients have insufficient information and knowledge to 











leave this decision to their GP [46,47]. Additionally, they do not want to jeopardise their 













These findings suggest: 
 
Proposition 3 
A directive-influencing style, driven by a system with a single purchaser and limited patient 
choice, may benefit care-chain management but care providers may see this as unproductive 
over-interference 
 
Limitations and future research 
This study offers new insights into healthcare purchasers’ strategies and actions. We identify 
differences in a purchaser’s engagement, strategic lens and influencing style, and observe 
benefits and disadvantages of their approaches. It appears that three healthcare system 
characteristics are key in explaining healthcare purchasers’ strategies and actions aimed at 
improving care chains: the number of purchasers in a given region; a substantial clinician, 
alongside managerial, purchaser governance; and the extent of freedom to choose secondary 
care. The English CCG studied had several positive examples of strategic purchasing, which 
potentially benefit care delivered to patients with chronic diseases such as COPD. This may 
seem counter-intuitive given the quality and capacity issues reported with the English 
system [33,49]. However, per capita healthcare spending is substantially lower in England 
than in Sweden and the Netherlands [49,50], so the reported quality and capacity issues may 
reflect NHS budget constraints rather than a purchaser’s inability to improve care chains. 
In this study, we limited ourselves to the impact of system characteristics on healthcare 
purchasing behaviour and we did not compare the patient outcomes of healthcare purchasing 
systems. We did not assume that purchasing is a major determinant of health outcomes in 
general, a view that has not been empirically validated, but only that purchasing does affect 
healthcare coordination, for which there is considerable evidence [20,51]. The outcomes 
could be incorporated in future research. To do so fairly, one would have to invoke the 
economic ‘ceteris paribus’ clause: ‘all other things being equal’. 
We have focused on to what extent a purchaser is able or willing to manage its care 
chain and how this relates to various healthcare system characteristics. We recognise that 
providers’ actions are also likely to determine how and if purchasers can fulfil their role. For 
example, studying whether different provider characteristics and responses can be identified, 
and how purchasers deal with such responses, may provide greater understanding of 
healthcare purchasing. Addressing the provider’s perspective is thus an important area of 
future study. 
Furthermore, our aim was to study healthcare purchasers’ attempts to coordinate 
chronic care, and specifically COPD care chains, that consist predominantly of GPs and 
hospitals. We have given less attention to the roles of the separate, mainly municipal, 
organisations that are the main purchasers of care-home, social and mental healthcare in these 
three regions. To what extent healthcare purchasers align their strategies and actions with 
other bodies responsible for contracting chronic care for patients with COPD or other diseases 
remains an important question for future research. 
By using a positive deviance sample of vanguard regions, we examined each health 
system at its strongest in terms of purchaser possibilities to improve coordination. This 










that purchasers’ coordination of care chains elsewhere in the health systems studied may be 
weaker than reported here. In line with this, future research may compare multiple healthcare 
purchasers in the same healthcare system which may answer why purchasers develop certain, 
possibly different, strategies and actions. 
Policy implications 
Policymakers and purchasers should regularly consider whether purchasers have sufficient 
influence, professional knowledge, responsibility and ability to coordinate the care chain and 
to guide patients through it. 
A multi-purchaser system can have benefits such as harnessing the insurer’s reputation 
and providing the possibility for patients to switch insurer. As we see in the Netherlands, such 
mechanisms may prevent issues with provider capacity and long waiting times for accessing 
care [49]. However, it can, as we found, hinder improving care chain coordination. The 
ministry’s move to enforce National Framework Agreements, which limit and shift national 
health budgets, illustrates that the anticipated effects of purchaser competition have not yet 
appeared. Importantly, purchasing should be a mutual process in which the expertise of 
providers is heard. A single regional purchaser appears well placed to influence task division 
and encourage collaboration along care chains. However, an overly engaged purchaser can be 
experienced by providers as burdensome and meddlesome, with ‘micro-commissioning’ [11] 
threatening their professional autonomy. In short, we conclude that multiple purchasers can be 
too fragmented, whilst single purchasers can become too interventionist. 
Collaborative relationships help achieve agreements over chronic care improvements 
and thereby better long-term care outcomes. This is not to say that purchasers should not also 
focus on containing costs and providing access to care [11]. Thus, while professional 
knowledge and responsibility can encourage trusting relationships, managerial responsibility 
ensures attention to ensuring access to care and controlling costs. Even with a single 
purchaser, balancing these policy goals is difficult. 
Purchasers can take a proactive and sometimes directive approach to managing task 
division and collaboration along care chains. With too little influence, purchasers may 
respond in regulatory ways that increase providers’ administrative burden. As such, the power 
balance between purchasers and providers is a delicate issue. When looking for ways to 
strengthen healthcare purchasing, we would stress that policymakers should critically 
consider policies related to patient choice and the gatekeeper position of GPs [52]. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, we have provided fresh perspectives on healthcare purchasing by showing that 
purchaser strategies vary based on their engagement, strategic lens and influencing style. To 
achieve strategic purchasing, an important task for policymakers is to consider what is the 
right balance in their system across three dimensions: single versus multiple purchaser 
system, purchasers’ internal governance, and the breadth of patient choice of providers, 
especially with secondary care. Irrespective of political preferences for market- or public-
based systems, purchasers are expected to strategically contract chain-wide care which 
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Table 1. Case details and data collection 




England Suburban population 
Size: ~300,000, majority 
low socioeconomic 
status 
Purchaser: five purchaser managers (1 
individual, 2 group interviews), 
purchaser medical advisor 
Providers: respiratory nurse, 
pulmonologist 









Sweden Urban population 
Size: >1,000,000, 
mixture of high and low 
socioeconomic status 
Purchaser: three purchaser managers 
Providers: GP, pulmonologist, 
emergency medical specialist, 
Other: three healthcare consultants (1 
individual, 1 group  interview) 









The Netherlands Mixed urban and rural 
population 
Size: ~500,000, mixture 
of high and low 
socioeconomic status 
Purchaser: insurer purchasing manager, 
insurer medical advisor 
Providers: pulmonologist, GP, hospital 
case manager, diagnostic clinic 
manager, two hospital managers 





















Table 2. Summary of purchaser strategies and actions (England) 
 
  
Purchaser strategies and actions Representative quotes 
Category Observation  
Clinical 
involvement 
Large involvement of GP 
clinical leads 
“What enabled CCGs to make the biggest difference is that we 
knew about this, because we are led by doctors that are out there 
in the practices. They would constantly tell us about this 
problem” (CCG Director of organisational development) 
Support to 
providers 
Strong support by clinical 
leads, commissioners. Data 
analysts are available and 
involved in development 
“So, I work with one of the CCG commissioners to try and 
develop the Right Care Project within [region] and some of that 
is in terms of early diagnosis and some in terms of admission 
avoidance, or admission strategies, trying to optimise care” 




relationships with providers. 
Tensions remain 
“I have tried to get rid of, what some commissioners would say 
to the providers: ‘well we say, so you do’. That is not a way of 
getting people to work together. And the commissioners can have 
a bad name sometimes, thinking they know better than the 
experts” (CCG Director of organisational development) 
Focus of 
attention 
Patient focus: patient access, 
outcomes and experience are 
basis of purchasing strategy 
“Once a week at a community centre in[(region], there is a peer 
support network for people who are like-minded with similar 
conditions. They get value from discussions with others on their 
coping mechanisms; it’s obviously reducing social isolation and 
loneliness, with a coordinator who does great things including 
getting people into talks and doing workshops. And they have 
nurses and doctors to provide the opportunity to ask any 
questions about their condition, certainly the evaluation is 
looking really, really promising” (CCG commissioner) 
Time horizon Long-term: assumption that 
better health leads to long-term 
savings and good allocation of 
resources 
“If we look at the issues in the UK, and across your country and 
everywhere else: aging population, complex problems, 
obesity…the reactive acute medical model we've been running 
for donkey's years, we can't go on with that anymore. This model 
really isn't suitable for the majority of our elderly population, 
who need long-term, chronic care” (CCG director of primary 
care) 
Power use Moderate: power due to a 
single purchasing system for 
GP and hospital care 
“To use the Italian expression of the mafia; we gave them an 
offer they couldn't refuse. And part of that was, this is where we 
are going – this is the model of the future. If you really don't 
want to join us, then we will commission it from somewhere else. 







between providers to achieve 
integration, managing 
relationships with other 
organisations who pay for care 
“So we’ve created Teams Without Walls, which are teams of 
people that are employed by six, seven, eight different 
organisations. But they work together as one team. And what 
pulls them together is the shared population they are working 
for. We haven’t issued a contract yet for this new model of care, 
but we have already got people working in those teams” (CCG 
Director of organisational development) 










Table 3. Summary of purchaser strategies and actions (Sweden) 
Purchaser strategies and actions Representative quotes 
 
Category Observation  
Clinical 
involvement 
Moderate involvement of 
medical advisors who also 
work part-time as 
practitioners 
“But also the knowledge about healthcare, the medical issues, that 
is very important. So, there are quite a lot of physicians working as 
administrators in the purchasing organisation. There are very many 
nurses working as well” (CC Health economist (retired)) 
Support to 
providers 
Substantial effort and 
capacity of medical 
advisors, data-analysts, 
economists 
“But what we are trying very hard here to do, and you may have 
heard about that already, is to make the patient records available to 
everyone, so that if I go to a primary centre, then I can also access 
the patient record of the hospital and essentially from the different 
visits that this patient has made. So that will be quite a change” 
(CC Head of unit for health development) 
Relationship 
management 
Moderate: purchaser seen as 
technocratic, particularly 
staff with economic and 
regulatory backgrounds 
“By commissioning here, we can tell them [care providers] which 





Patient focus: the CC puts 
much effort into channelling 
patients through providing 
information 
“We try to do that by firstly encouraging people to go to primary 
care. We have something called a Care Guide. As a patient you can 
go there, you can enter your condition, and then you can see nearby 
providers where you can go if you have [for example] a headache. 
And then we, of course, try to advise people to go to the nearest 
primary care centre” (CC Head of unit for health development) 
Time horizon Medium-term: in practice 
hard to implement long-term 
improvements, in part 
related to electoral cycle 
“And, of course, politicians are elected for only four years, so they 
need results, they can’t wait for [evaluations], then you will not be 
re-elected” (CC Health Economist (retired)) 
Power use Little: unlimited patient 
choice limits the CC’s 
ability to steer 
“I would say that the people here [at the CC] think that they 
influence actual care a lot, much more than is actually true...when 
we are trying to do less and be less regulating over details, we 





Aims for chain-wide 
improvement, but in practice 
takes a strong administrative 
role aimed at contracting 
individual providers 
“We have trusted market forces, privatisations, economic thinking 















Table 4. Summary of purchaser strategies and actions (the Netherlands) 
 




Category Observation  
Clinical 
involvement 
Low involvement of the small 
number of medical advisors, 
whose main task is to judge 
individual patient cases 
“We would like a much greater medical content in the 
negotiations…Now these are [negotiated by] contract 
managers who talk with hospital managers. It would be quite 




Little medical advisory or data 
analysis capacity. Little time 
for relationship management 
“Look, these people come and go. At the insurers, the 
purchasers, there is no continuity. The continuity is with us, 
and every time we have to deal with different puppets. At a 
given moment, after a couple of years, that whole group that 




Poor: arm’s length 
relationships, suspicious stance 
towards the providers’ 
intentions 
“I always find that, personally, with shared savings 
[contracts], you can only do that with the worst in class, 
because otherwise there is nothing to save. So, what you 
actually do is that you reward those who do not perform well 
for their bad behaviour” (Insurer purchasing manager) 
Focus of 
attention 
Main goal is to control costs to 
keep insurance premiums low 
”In our offer, we usually talk about quality and the larger 
developments and innovations, but actually it comes down to 
the insurer saying: ‘that is all nice and sweet, that you want 
all that, but we have this [budget]ceiling and the care costs 
should go down’” (Hospital sales manager) 
Time horizon Mostly short-term: aim is to 
control costs, reduce patient 
volumes within a financial 
year. Some movement to long-
term contracts. 
“Practice shows that the healthcare costs [of our population] 
are pretty high. And we would like to bring that to the average 
level. So there are all sorts of actions to look critically at the 
tariffs for chronic care, also COPD care. ‘Is this still 
appropriate’?” (Insurer medical advisor) 
Power use Limited: purchaser competition 
increases dependence of 
insurers on care providers, 
especially large ones 
”How I experience it, is that it is a balance [of power]. So, we 
can give some counterweight to the insurer. That has to do 
with our position [as a university hospital], we can have very 





Strong administrative role 
aimed at ensuring contracts 
with individual providers 
“I am very critical about these new financing models. [People 
say] ‘we need to do something with population contracts’, [I 
think] why? Is the current way of financing not right? Doesn’t 
















Table 5. Purchaser strategies and actions, aggregated into three categories, explained by main 
healthcare system drivers. 




Aggregate category of purchaser 
strategies and actions 
 




Purchaser engagement Purchaser governance Support to providers 
Relationship management 
Focus of attention 
Purchaser’s strategic lens 
Purchaser competition and 
Purchaser governance Time horizon 
Power use 
Purchaser’s influencing style 
Purchaser competition and 
Patient choice Chain management approach 
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